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IV. JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) 
and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, does a prior 
unsatisfied federal court judgment for securities and common law 
fraud against a non-party to this action preclude plaintiff from 
litigating the issue of defendants' causation of plaintiff's 
damages under claims of legal malpractice, even though plaintiff 
did not become aware of defendants' malpractice until defendant 
Shaphren testified at the prior federal trial? 
This legal determination is reviewed for correctness. See 
Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Common law. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Prior to filing this action, plaintiff obtained a federal 
court judgment against non-parties based upon claims of common law 
1 
and federal and state securities fraud. Defendants herein were not 
parties to that action. That judgment remains unsatisfied. 
Plaintiff sued defendants for legal malpractice based on 
theories of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty for the same 
damages. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, claiming the issue of "causation" 
of plaintiff's damages had been determined in the federal court 
action and the judgment precluded a finding of defendants' 
causation of the same damages. The trial court granted the Motion 
on March 10, 1997, holding that causation of the damages had been 
determined, and defendants' fault "could and should have been 
adjudicated and apportioned in the prior action." Plaintiff filed 
a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 1997. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In March 1990, Automobile Assurance Financial Corp., Venuti & 
Associates, Inc., Venuti Partners, Ltd., and Frank B. Venuti 
(collectively referred to as "Venuti") filed an action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah against 
Syrett Corporation, formerly known as Ruby's Inn ("Syrett"). 
Syrett counterclaimed. The parties invoked subject matter juris-
diction by alleging violations of federal securities laws. The 
2 
parties also filed state-law claims, including common law and 
securities fraud. (R. at 147-204.) 
The federal court controversy involved Venuti's representation 
to Syrett that he could raise substantial capital for the Bryce 
Canyon hotel complex through a stock offering without risk to 
Syrett, and the disputed representation that he would receive no 
compensation unless the offering raised $10,000,000.00. Compensa-
tion for the successful offering was to be 100,000 shares of Syrett 
stock (approximately 9% of the total equity ownership of Syrett). 
Venuti obtained 100,000 shares of Syrett stock despite the 
offering's failure to raise a penny, and he refused to return the 
stock based upon his claim of unconditional ownership. (R. at 326-
37. ) 1 
The federal district court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on June 23, 1993, in favor of Syrett and a 
Judgment in Syrett's favor on June 15, 1994. The Judgment was on 
Syrett's claims of Venuti's violations of Sections 10(b) and 
15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 (federal 
'Syrett also filed a Third-Party Complaint against John Riley 
in connection with the Counterclaim against Venuti. Mr. Riley was 
an attorney involved in the transaction with Venuti. (R. at 147-
81.) 
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securities fraud), of violations of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1, 
-3(1), and -22 (state securities fraud) and of common law fraud. 
(R. at 349-55.)2 
In connection with the offering, Mr. Shaphren and his then law 
firm (Parsons & Crowther herein),3 together with Mr. Venuti, 
prepared a private placement memorandum ("PPM"), dated February 28, 
1989, relating to the issuance and sale of Class B common stock in 
Syrett to potential investors. (R. at 265-325.) The PPM 
identified Defendant Shaphren and his firm Parsons & Crowther as 
attorneys for Syrett (the issuer) in the stock offering handled by 
Mr. Venuti. (R. at 3 02.) At the federal trial, Mr. Shaphren for 
the first time denied he was counsel for plaintiff Syrett despite 
that disclosure to prospective investors, and he admitted his 
representation of Mr. Venuti was potentially in conflict with the 
interests of the Syretts. He also recognized that it was advisable 
that the Syretts have another attorney to counsel them on the 
2The Federal District Court also entered Judgment against 
Mr. Riley on the same claims, making him jointly and severally 
liable with Venuti for the Judgment. The Court found that 
Mr. Riley had also breached his fiduciary duty to Syrett. (R. at 
349-^55.) 
defendants Shaphren and Parsons & Crowther were not parties 
to the prior federal action between Venuti, Riley and Syrett. 
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complexities of the transaction, but he could not recall ever 
suggesting that to plaintiff. (R. at 359, 361-64, 410-11,415-16, 
431.) 
Despite the fact that the offering failed to raise any money, 
Mr. Venuti obtained 100,000 shares of Class B stock in Syrett 
without the knowledge and consent of Syrett and in violation of 
Syrett's understanding of the agreement with Mr. Venuti. (R. at 
329-34.) 
In preparation for and shortly before the federal court trial, 
Syrett, through its counsel, attempted to meet with Defendant 
Shaphren to discuss with him the testimony he would give at the 
trial. Defendant Shaphren refused to meet with Syrett or discuss 
his anticipated testimony. (R. at 359.) 
Contrary to the express provision in the PPM, the under-
standing and belief of Syrett, and the understanding and belief of 
Mr. Venuti, Defendant Shaphren testified at the federal court trial 
that he did not represent Syrett in the stock offering handled by 
Mr. Venuti. Defendant Shaphren testified that he represented 
Mr. Venuti and Mr. Venutifs company, AAFC, in the stock offering 
handled by Mr. Venuti and that the PPM contained a false statement. 
(R. at 359, 361-64, 431.) 
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At the federal trial, Mr. Shaphren also testified that: 
* Mr. Venuti was not required to register as a broker under 
federal and state securities law (R. at 377-79, 422-25, 440); 
* Mr. Venuti was not required to register as an agent under 
state securities laws (R. at 377-79, 422-25, 440); 
* Mr. Venuti did not receive transaction-based compensation 
in connection with the stock offering under applicable law and 
industry standards, and the amount he obtained was not unreasonable 
or excessive, despite the fact that he failed to sell any stock or 
raise any capital through the stock offering (R. at 368-376, 422, 
426-28, 432-39); and 
* the stock offering as structured by Mr. Venuti was viable 
and marketable (R„ at 380-82). 
Defendant Shaphren also testified and admitted on the record 
in the federal trial that his testimony there was tempered by his 
desire to avoid personal liability. (R. at 429-31.) 
After the federal trial, Judge Sam issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (''Findings and Conclusions'') , which concluded, 
contrary to Defendant Shaphrenfs testimony, that: 
* Mr. Venuti was required to register as a broker under 
federal and state securities law (R. 340-42); 
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* Mr. Venuti did receive transaction-based compensation in 
connection with the stock offering under applicable law and indus-
try standards, and the amount he obtained was unreasonable and 
excessive (R. at 329-32, 342); and 
* the stock offering as structured by Mr. Venuti was not 
viable and was completely unmarketable. (R. at 329-32). 
Despite the fact that the federal court entered Judgment 
joointly and severally against defendants Venuti and Riley and in 
favor of plaintiff in the amount of $295,670.06 exclusive of post-
judgment interest at the legal rate beginning June 15, 1994 (R. at 
349-55), plaintiff has been unable to satisfy the Judgment. (R. at 
8.) Plaintiff does not seek a double recovery or an amount in 
damages different than that found by the federal court, but seeks 
only to be made whole. 
Plaintiff has alleged that defendants in this case breached 
their fiduciary duty and the duty of care which proximately caused 
plaintiff's damages. (R. at 1-11.) 
On defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, the 
trial court ruled that (1) the damages plaintiff was seeking in 
this action were the same as those plaintiffs had been awarded in 
the federal court action (which plaintiff does not dispute); 
7 
(2) wShaphren's fault could and should have been adjudicated and 
apportioned in the prior adjudication"; and (3) u [c]ollateral 
estoppel principles preclude this claim against defendant, now." 
(R. at 523-25.) 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The "issue" to be tried here is not "causation" in a general 
or abstract sense on legal theories unrelated to those alleged 
herein, but whether these defendants' conduct--negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty--caused plaintiff's damages. The issue of 
defendants' causation of plaintiff's damages has never been 
visited, nor could it have been, and thus does not fall under the 
rubric of collateral estoppel. Further, the issue of whether 
defendants caused plaintiff's injury was not necessary to the 
federal court action. Finally, plaintiff had little knowledge or 
incentive to litigate fully defendants' fault and causation in the 
federal court action against others for securities and common law 
fraud. Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply. 
Moreover, the trial court erred by stating that these 
defendants' fault could and should have been apportioned in the 
underlying action. By making this ruling, the trial court has 
8 
implicitly held that Utah is a "one-action" rule state, a rule of 
law which has never been established by an appellate court in this 
State. The one-action rule, however, is not a part of the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel. Rather, it is a legislative or public 
policy determination that requires litigants to try all "fault-
based" causation in a single action. Indeed, some states have 
implemented the one-action rule for the very reason that a finding 
of one person's causation of damages does not invoke collateral 
estoppel or preclude a finding of another's causation of those 
damages. If collateral estoppel effected a bar to such later 
cases, a one-action rule would be wholly unnecessary. Utah's Tort 
Reform Act does not mandate a one-action rule. 
Even if Utah were a one-action rule state, however, the rule 
could not apply in this case. The one-action rule applies only in 
the context of "fault-based" conduct, or conduct that is 
comparable--so that all conduct can be compared in one action and 
each person is held to be responsible only for his percentage of 
fault-based causation. Statutory and common law fraud is not 
comparable with negligence or other "fault-based" conduct under the 
Tort Reform Act. Liability in the context of fraud remains joint 
and several. Thus, where there are two tortfeasors who cause the 
9 
same damages, one in fraud and one in negligence, they are jointly 
and severally liable. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE. 
Defendants argued below, and the trial court agreed, that the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel barred plaintiff's claims against 
them. The doctrine is that a party to a prior action is estopped 
to relitigate an identical issue if it was actually raised, con-
tested, decided against him and necessary to the judgment. Moore's 
Federal Practice, IB, % 0.443 [2], pp. III. -564, 574. Harline v. 
Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996) (issue must be "identical"; 
the "issue must have been fully, fairly, and competently 
litigated"); Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (collateral estoppel does not apply unless 
issue "was actually litigated"); Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 27 
and comment e (issue must be "actually litigated" and the deter-
mination must be "essential to the judgment"; "[a] judgment is not 
conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues which might have 
been but were not litigated and determined in the prior action"); 
id. comment h ("[i]f issues are determined but the judgment is not 
10 
dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of these issues in 
a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded. Such 
determinations have the characteristics of dicta, and may not 
ordinarily be the subject of an appeal by the party against whom 
they were made"). 
However, "a new issue that can be urged without any contra-
diction of the prior adjudication, remains open to litigation." 
Moore's Federal Practice, IB, 1(0.443 [2], P- III.-577. Indeed, 
even "an incidental or collateral determination of an issue that 
was not material in the prior action does not foreclose reconsid-
eration of that issue in later litigation in which the issue is 
material." Id. H 0.443 [5.-1], p. III.-583. 
1. Courts in Other States Have Concluded That 
Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Subsequent 
Claims Against Different Defendants. 
Utah appellate courts have not addressed the issue of col-
lateral estoppel within the context of a case involving litigation 
against a defendant or defendants in one action and a subsequent 
litigation against an entirely different defendant or defendants 
under different theories for the same damages. A number of courts 
have addressed the issue within the context of fault-based claims--
11 
negligence, strict liability and the like4--and have concluded that 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the subsequent 
litigation. For example, in O'Connor v. State of New York, 512 
N.Y.S.2d 536 (S. Ct. A.D. 1987), a pedestrian was killed in a 
crosswalk after colliding with a bicyclist on a state highway 
during a race. O'Connor's estate first sued the bicyclist and his 
association, and a jury awarded damages of $980,000.00, assessing 
fault 60% to decedent, 34% to the bicyclist and 6% to the settling 
association. O'Connor's estate then sued the state for negligence 
for the manner in which it had patrolled the race course. After 
trial the court found the state was negligent and set damages at 
$680,870.00, apportioning fault at 50% against the state and 50% 
against the decedent. Id. at 538. The state appealed the judgment 
on the ground of collateral estoppel. The court explained the 
doctrine and why the state's contention was without merit: 
[T]here are left but two necessary requirements for the 
invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There 
4The cases cited below hold that a claim of negligence against 
one party does not collaterally estop a plaintiff from suing 
another party because the issues vis-a-vis the plaintiff and each 
defendant are dissimilar. The case before the Court presents even 
greater dissimilarity of issues than the cited cases because, as 
discussed below, fraud is not considered fault-based and therefore 
is not subject to comparison with the negligence of a plaintiff or 
other defendants. 
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first must be an identity of issue which has necessarily 
been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the 
present action and, secondly, there must have been a full 
and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to 
be controlling. . . . We have no difficulty in concluding 
that decedent's negligence was an issue common to both 
actions. The relevant issue is the degree of that negli-
gence. In the [prior] action, decedent's culpability was 
established in relation to and in comparison with that of 
the other parties to that action. The State was not and 
could not have been a party thereto . . . . The issue 
with which we are presently concerned involves the 
question as to what degree of culpability the State 
should be charged with, if any, an issue that was not 
decided nor was it even considered in the [prior] action. 
Issue preclusion is available to protect a defendant who 
was not a party to an earlier lawsuit from relitigation 
of an issue considered alternatively in the prior trial 
only when it is clear that the prior determination 
squarely addressed and specifically decided the issue 
. . . . The issue of the comparative negligence of the 
parties to this action was never addressed or determined. 
. . . [We are led] inescapably to the conclusion that 
collateral estoppel may not be properly invoked in the 
present case, for the reason that the issue here involves 
the comparative degree of culpability and the trial of 
the facts in the first action had no occasion to consider 
the State may have shared some responsibility for dece-
dent's death. 
Id. at 540.! 
5The earlier case of Shanley v. Callanan Industries, Inc., 444 
N.Y.S.2d 585 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1981), is also instructive. There, two 
separate negligence actions were brought as a result of an 
automobile collision. In the first action, the jury found the 
driver 100% at fault. The defendant in the second action moved for 
summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. The Court of 
Appeals of New York explained that the "test of a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate is designed to assure that the party 
13 
Likewise, in Nogue v. Estate of Santiago, 540 A. 2d 889 (N.J. 
A.D. 1988), Nogue, a passenger in a car operated by Santiago, was 
injured in a single-car accident. Santiago was killed. Nogue 
sought uninsured motorist benefits from Santiago's insurance 
carrier, and the matter was arbitrated. The arbitrator found a 
phantom vehicle had caused the accident and xx*based on the evidence 
presented, I do not find any negligence on the part of the driver 
[Santiago].'" Id. at 890. Nogue sued Santiago's estate while the 
arbitration proceedings were pending, and after the arbitration 
award the estate moved to dismiss on the ground of collateral 
estoppel.6 The court denied the motion, reasoning as follows: 
Nogue's rights against Santiago were not fully or fairly 
litigated in the arbitration. The only relevant issue in 
Nogue's arbitration was the phantom's negligence. . . . 
Nogue's counsel did not formulate or project any issue as 
to Santiago's negligence. No such issue was litigated, 
in fact between Nogue and the Santiago estate. . . . 
against whom collateral estoppel is being invoked has had an 
opportunity to present his case." Id. at 587. Plaintiff was not 
collaterally estopped from presenting his case against another 
defendant. 
6The court announced, and the parties apparently agreed, that 
an arbitration award, under appropriate circumstances, has the same 
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as a formal adjudi-
cation. 540 A.2d at 890. 
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We also note that there was little, if any, incentive for 
any party to the arbitration to urge or deny Santiago's 
liability. . . . 
[W]e find that Nogue did not have adequate notice that he 
would be bound by the Santiago UM adjudication . . ., 
that Nogue was not afforded a right or fair opportunity 
to contest the issue of Santiago's negligence . . ., that 
no issues of law and fact with respect to Santiago's 
liability to Nogue were formulated . . ., that it was not 
foreseeable that the resolution of Santiago's UM claim 
would be dispositive of Nogue's liability claim . . ., 
that Nogue had neither an adequate opportunity or [sic] 
incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication of 
Santiago's liability in the arbitration . . . and that 
the arbitration procedures did not provide a sufficient 
means for determining Santiago's liability to Nogue 
. . . . In short, the joint UM arbitrations were not 
intended, structured or conducted to resolve, and thus 
cannot be said to have fairly determined, the issue of 
liability between Nogue and Santiago. 
Id. at 893. 
In Drescher v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 585 F. Supp. 555 
(D. Conn. 1984) , Drescher was injured when he was servicing and 
testing a device that was designed to start an automobile by remote 
control. He first sued the owner of the automobile, Girard Motors, 
for negligence and the court entered a judgment assessing him 80% 
of the fault and finding the automobile distributor had adequately 
warned. After that case was concluded, he sued the automobile 
distributor, Hoffman Motors, for the same injuries. Hoffman Motors 
moved the court for summary judgment, claiming plaintiff was barred 
15 
under the doctrine of non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel 
because "all issues material to this case ha[d] already been 
decided in a previous litigation." Id. at 556• The court denied 
the motion as follows: 
The sole essential issue in the first case, actually 
litigated by the parties and passed upon by this Court, 
was that of Drescher's negligence vis-a-vis that of 
Girard Motors and its agents. Any findings in the first 
case concerning Hoffman's obligation to warn were 
certainly not essential to a comparison of Drescher's 
negligence to that of Girard Motors. The remaining 
material issues alleged in Drescher's second complaint, 
to wit, Hoffman's alleged liability under negligence, 
strict liability or breach of warranty theories either 
arise under different facts or are to be decided under 
different legal standards than the facts and issues of 
the first case. 
Id. at 558. 
Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. Mass. 1980) is 
particularly instructive on the issue of collateral estoppel 
because, unlike the foregoing cases, it involved an action against 
one party for fraud and a subsequent action against a different 
party under Massachusetts' Deceptive Practices Act and for common 
law fraud. There, the court rejected a real estate broker's claim 
that the action against him for common law fraud and deceptive 
practices was barred by a prior fraud action against the sellers of 
the property, even though the plaintiff had satisfied his prior 
16 
judgment against the sellers. The court explained that the 
differences in the legal theories in the two cases was a compelling 
factor in rejecting application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. 
Similarly, as further explained below, collateral estoppel 
does not apply in this case because (1) there was no identity of 
issues; the federal trial involved statutory and common law fraud 
against Venuti and Riley; this case raises totally different issues 
of legal malpractice; (2) determining defendants' malpractice was 
wholly unnecessary in order to obtain the fraud judgment against 
Venuti and Riley in federal court; and (3) the Syretts were not 
even aware of defendants' malpractice until Mr. Shaphren testified 
at the prior trial. Therefore, there was no full and fair 
opportunity to try the issue presented by this case in the prior 
federal action. 
2. Whether Defendants Caused Plaintiff's Injury 
Was Not Litigated: It Was Neither Raised Nor 
Contested. 
In ruling that the issue of causation has been raised and 
determined, the trial court overlook the doctrine's requirement 
that only "identical" issues that were "actually litigated" may be 
precluded. Plaintiff does not dispute that Messrs. Venuti's and 
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Riley's conduct, in violation of federal and state securities laws 
and state common law, resulted in a finding of their liability for 
plaintiff's damages under the various elements of the statutory and 
intentional fraud claims against them. Those were the issues 
raised and contested in the federal court action. However, the 
Court will search the pleadings in vain to find any assertion of 
fault or causation against defendants or any response to such an 
assertion meeting such issues. The Court will also search the 
federal court record in vain to find any order that these defen-
dants' conduct be assessed for fault or causation. Whether these 
defendants' conduct, along with or in addition to the conduct of 
others, caused plaintiff's damages was not a part of the prior 
case. 
Finally, as noted in Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 
P.2d 873, 877 (Utah 1983), issue preclusion does not apply where 
the theory of recovery differs from that in the prior case. The 
issue thus was not actually litigated. Indeed, it would have been 
impossible for defendants' conduct to have been litigated because 
Syrett first learned at the federal trial that it was Shaphren's 
position that he was not Syrett's attorney. 
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3. The Issue of Whether Defendants Caused 
Plaintiff's Injury Was Never Determined, 
Either Favorably or Adversely to Plaintiff. 
Simply because others were found liable for plaintiff's 
damages under fraud theories does not mean there was, by some 
implication, a finding against plaintiff that others--who were not 
parties to the federal court case and whose conduct was not 
scrutinized there--could not also be found liable for plaintiff's 
damages. As both a factual and a conceptual matter, a finding of 
one person's causation does not negate the possibility of another's 
fault or causation for those damages,7 particularly when (1) the 
elements of the legal theories on which the former's liability was 
based differ generally from the allegations of fault in the latter 
claim, (2) the facts relating to the latter's fault and causation 
were not presented to the fact finder, (3) there was no deter-
mination or assessment of these defendants' fault or causation, 
(4) the issue of these defendants' causation of plaintiff's damages 
can be addressed without any contradiction of the prior action and, 
(5) as discussed below, the issue of defendants' causation of 
plaintiff's damages was completely irrelevant to whether Venuti's 
7See, e.g., MUJI 3.15, and cases cited therein, recognizing 
there may be multiple proximate causes of damages. 
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and Riley's misconduct had caused plaintiff's damages, and, under 
the circumstances of this case, these defendants' liability would 
be joint and several. 
Moreover, a clear indication the issue was never fully and 
finally resolved is plaintiff's inability to obtain appellate 
review of the issue. Plaintiff could not have obtained appellate 
review of the issue for two reasons. First, there was no factual 
or legal finding or conclusion, one way or the other, concerning 
defendants' causation of plaintiff's damages. Second, plaintiff 
obtained a judgment in its favor. See Restatement (2d) of 
Judgments § 28(1) and comment a ("the availability of review for 
the correction of errors has become critical to the application of 
preclusion doctrine"). 
4. The Issue of Whether Defendants Caused 
Plaintiff's Injury Was Not Necessary to the 
Federal Court Judgment. 
As explained by Professor Moore, ua new issue that can be 
urged without any contradiction of the prior adjudication, remains 
open to litigation." IB, 1[0.443 [2], p. III.-577. The issue of 
causation here can be urged without any contradiction of the prior 
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adjudication.8 Indeed, defendants conceded that their causation 
was not urged in the federal court, which confirms that the issue 
was neither raised nor necessary to the federal judgment. (R. at 
135.9) The underlying case involved claims against others of 
intentional violations of federal and state securities laws, common 
law of fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and breach of fiduciary duty. The elements of those claims, 
including causation, were and could be determined without the 
introduction of any facts concerning these defendants' causation. 
Those claims were and could be determined fully without any 
consideration of whether others, in addition to the defendants in 
the federal court action, may also be liable for some or all of the 
same damages. 
Plaintiff does not seek a double recovery for its losses, only 
to be made whole, and any prior recovery of some portion of damages 
would necessarily be credited to any overlapping recovery against 
those defendants. 
9The quote, in bold letters, is as follows: "Plaintiff did not 
claim any other person caused in whole or in part these damages." 
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5. Plaintiff Had Little Knowledge or Incentive to 
Litigate Fully and Vigorously the Issue of 
These Defendants' Fault and Causation of Their 
Damages. 
The principal reason plaintiff has brought claims against 
these defendants now is the discovery, during the prior trial, of 
actionable conduct on the part of these defendants and plaintiff's 
inability to satisfy most of the judgment. These defendants were 
not parties to the federal court action, and thus plaintiff had no 
incentive to litigate, in any respect, the defendants' potential 
causation of plaintiff's damages. Even though Messrs. Riley and 
Venuti were in a better position to know of Mr. Shaphren's conduct, 
they did not ask the federal court for a reduction of their ufault" 
based on such conduct. 
B. DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLD-
ING, ARE MORE AKIN TO THE "ONE -ACTION" RULE WHICH 
DIFFERS FROM COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND DOES NOT APPLY 
TO THIS CASE. 
1. The "One -Action" Rule Differs From the 
Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel. 
Defendants' contention--that a finding in federal court of 
one's causation (by means of fraud) for plaintiff's damages 
precludes a later finding on other theories of another's causation 
for those same damages--is more closely akin to the "one-action" 
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rule. The one-action rule is conceptually distinct from the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel.10 The one-action rule is a statutory 
creation that saves judicial resources by requiring all "fault-
based" claims--claims subject to comparison--to be heard in a 
single action. The Supreme Court of Kansas leads the country in 
explaining the Rule. The case of Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127 (Kan. 1981), and its progeny, 
illustrate both the rule and its distinction from the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. 
In Albertson, plaintiff, while driving a Volkswagen van, 
collided with a vehicle driven by a Mr. Travis. He sued Travis in 
state court and, under a comparative negligence instruction, the 
I 
jury determined damages to be $275,000.00, with 40% fault 
attributed to plaintiff and 60% attributed to Travis. Albertson 
then sued the van's manufacturer in federal court. The United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas certified the 
following question to the Kansas Supreme Court: 
Having once obtained a satisfied judgment for a portion 
of his injuries in a comparative negligence action, may 
10Indeed, if defendants' assertion were correct that collateral 
estoppel bars a subsequent finding of causation against a non-party 
to the first case, there would be no need for the "one-action" 
rule. 
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a plaintiff bring an action to recover damages for the 
remaining portion of his injuries against a defendant not 
a party to the first action, such second action being 
based on strict liability in tort? 
Id. at 1129c The federal district court had already ruled that 
collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the amount of 
Albertson's damages, limiting Albertson's potential recovery to the 
remaining 40%. The judge ruled, however, that collateral estoppel 
did not bar relitigation of the percentages of fault determined in 
the first action: 
In sum, this Court believes the apportionment of negli-
gence between drivers involved in a collision is not the 
same issue as the apportionment of causal fault among the 
same drivers and a strictly liable product manufacturer. 
Since the issues are not identical, plaintiff is not 
bound by the percentages of fault found in the prior 
action. Since the Court finds defendants' argument as to 
collateral estoppel to be without merit, it is clear that 
the issue previously discussed is controlling of the 
defendants' motion. 
Id. at 1129. 
Addressing the certified question, the Albertson court first 
found that under Kansas statute, the legislature required uall 
causes of action and claims for damage arising out of any act of 
negligence" to be litigated in one action. The court then 
explained that under Kansas' comparative fault act, strict lia-
bility was "fault-based" and therefore was subject to comparison in 
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a single action under the one-action rule. Id. at 1131-32. Thus, 
a determination of one person's causation of plaintiff's injury in 
a prior action did not preclude a finding of another person's 
causation of plaintiff's same injury in a subsequent action. The 
federal court expressly found it did not. Rather, the public 
policy of the state of Kansas required all "fault-based" claims 
arising out of a single incident to be tried together. 
2. Utah Is Not a "One-Action" Rule State. 
No appellate court in Utah has interpreted the Tort Reform Act 
to be a "one-action" rule. Utah's Tort Reform statute reads: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special 
verdicts determining the total amount of damages sus-
tained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each 
defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (emphasis supplied). 
Utah's substantive law provides that joinder of a tortfeasor 
for assessment of fault is conditioned on the diligence of and a 
timely request by one of the parties. The logical inferences from 
the statutory language are: (1) a defendant who fails timely to 
seek joinder of a person whose fault may have proximately caused a 
loss waives any right to a reduction of his percentage of fault; 
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(2) the court can proceed to a decree and do complete and final 
justice, within the meaning of substantive Utah law, if parties 
have chosen not to or failed to move the court to join persons 
whose fault may have been a contributing factor; (3) the statute 
does not create an "indispensable party" provision; and (4) the 
statute does not preclude a finding of another's causation in a 
different proceeding. 
Even if Utah were a "one-action" rule state, however, that 
rule could not apply here because the Tort Reform Act requires 
comparison of only "fault-based" claims--negligence, strict 
liability and the like.11 It does not accommodate comparison of 
intentional torts, as shown below. Moreover, tort reform 
eliminated joint and several liability for "fault-based" conduct 
only. 
HThe applicable provision stated: 
"Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or 
omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or 
damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, inclding 
negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a product, products liability and misue, 
modification or abuse of a product. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37. 
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3. Negligence Is Not Subject to Comparison With 
Fraud Because Fraud Is Not "Fault-Based." 
Thus, the Intentional Tortfeasor's Liability 
and That of the Negligent Tortfeasor Are Joint 
and Several. As Such, They Are Subject to 
Neither the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel 
nor The One-Action Rule. 
Utah's Tort Reform Act requires comparison of "fault-based" 
conduct out of which an injury arises. Many states, including 
Utah, do not allow a comparison of fault-based and non-fault based 
conduct for the purpose of reducing percentages of fault. Absent 
like conduct for comparative purposes, a defendant's fault would be 
joint and several with that of any other defendant (s) . Intentional 
misconduct, which is not fault-based, is not subject to comparison. 
This principle is illustrated by many cases. In Lynn v. Taylor, 
642 P.2d 131 (Kan. App. 1982), for example, a homeowner sued a 
vendor and real estate agent for fraud and a termite inspector for 
negligence. The trial court found the vendor and real estate agent 
had committed fraud and the termite inspector was negligent. The 
trial court entered judgment against all defendants, jointly and 
severally. The real estate agent appealed, claiming the concept of 
joint and several liability was abolished by the comparative 
negligence statute. The court rejected this argument: 
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[The Kansas Supreme Court] concluded that the doctrine of 
comparative fault is applicable to cases involving 
multiple claims against a number of defendants for negli-
gence, breach of implied warranty and strict liability. 
. • . There is, however, no authority for including an 
intentional tort such as fraud within the ambit of 
comparative fault principles, . . . Langston does not 
argue to the contrary but contends that the court should 
have attributed a percentage of fault to Thriftway and 
diminished the damages against Langston and Taylor by 
that percentage. This argument ignores the fact that 
above all, comparative negligence is a comparison of 
fault. . . . [U]nless fraud has a fault basis with which 
negligence can compare, it is difficult to envision how 
the court should have divined a particular portion of 
fault as traceable to Thriftway. . . . 
The abolition of joint and several liability . . . was 
limited to comparative negligence actions and did not 
eliminate such liability in all actions in which a 
negligence claim is established. We see no reason to 
extend that holding to this case simply because one 
defendant was negligent. Accordingly, it was proper for 
the trial judge to assess the actual damages against all 
defendants, jointly and severally. 
Id. at 135-36. See Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 914 P.2d 
976, 998 (Mont. 1996) ("the defendant's fraudulent conduct is not 
a form of negligence to which the plaintiff's negligence can be 
compared for the purpose of diminishing the plaintiff's recovery of 
damages"); Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enterprises, 922 P.2d 569, 
574 (N.M. 1996) and cases cited therein; Cummings v. Sea Lion 
Corp., 924 P.2d 1011, 1023 (Alaska 1996); MUJI 3.18 (a defendant 
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who intentionally causes injury is not entitled to a reduction of 
its fault based on a plaintiff's negligence). 
Where there has been no judicial determination of comparative 
(comparable) "fault," even in states where there is a one-action 
rule a plaintiff is not preluded from pursuing separate actions 
against tortfeasors. Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1988). 
Here, the principal bases of plaintiff's claims in federal 
court against Venuti and Riley was intentional misconduct under 
federal and state securities laws and common law fraud. The 
judgment was not "fault-based" because it involved intentional and 
statutory misconduct and was therefore not subject to comparison or 
reduction under Utah's Tort Reform Act. Their liability is joint 
and several. Venuti's and Riley's liability would not have been 
subject to comparison or reduction had Mr. Shaphren and his law 
firm been joined as defendants in the federal action. The issue of 
Venuti's and Riley's causation of plaintiff's injury was completely 
independent of and unrelated to whether defendants herein also 
caused the injury. Venuti's and Riley's causation therefore could 
not collaterally estop litigation of the issue whether defendants' 
conduct caused plaintiff's injuries. The latter issue was clearly 
unnecessary to and not a part of the federal court action. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Order granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for trial. 
XI. REQUEST FQR ORAL ARQVMENT 
Plaintiff requests oral argument due to the significance and 
novelty of the issue. 
DATED this ^ day of August, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Max D. Wheeder 
Stanley Ja Preston 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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XII. ADDENDUM 
1. MINUTE ENTRY, FEBRUARY 20, 1997 
2. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S [SIC] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, MARCH 10, 1997 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PAUL H. SHAPHREN, an 
individual and PARSONS & 




CASE NO. 930904040 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Oral Argument, and the 
Court having heard argument from both sides on January 31, 1997, 
and having taken the matter under advisement, and now having 
reviewed the Motion, Memorandum in support and Reply Memorandum and 
the Memorandum in opposition, in light of argument, and the Court 
being fully advised and finding good cause, rules as stated herein. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. This Court finds 
that a prior adjudication occurred (Automobile Assurance v. Svrett, 
et aL, Case No. 90-6-2245) , involving the same transaction. In 
that matter, plaintiff prevailed (on a Counterclaim), and got 
Judgment against two individuals, Venuti and Riley. Plaintiff in 
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this action now claims damages for Shaphren's alleged negligence 
and breach of fiduciary duty on the same stock offering 
transaction. It appears the damages that plaintiff claims were 
caused by Shaphren's alleged wrongful conduct are the damages 
plaintiff alluded to and got a Judgment on, in the other action 
against Venuti and Riley. 
This Court finds plaintiff's claims against Shaphren are 
barred by res judicata. The issue of the cause of plaintiff's 
damages was adjudicated in the other case, alluded to herein, 
wherein plaintiff was a party and a final Judgment on the merits 
occurred. 
It should be noted plaintiff does not dispute the facts set 
forth in defendants' Memorandum in support of its Motion, but adds 
nineteen additional facts. These other facts appear to be 
immaterial and don't appear to change the complexion of the case 
for purposes of Summary Judgment. Additionally, plaintiff 
stipulated at the hearing that defendants could amend their Answer. 
This makes moot the issue of whether defendants raised the 
collateral estoppel issue. Shaphren's fault could and should have 
been adjudicated and apportioned in the prior adjudication. 
Collateral estoppel principles preclude this claim against 
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defendant, now. The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted for these reasons. Counsel for defendants is to prepare 
Findings and an Order. 
Dated this o^-U day of Februarj 
LESLIE A. LE 
DISTRICT COUR' 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this. _day of 
February, 1997: 
Max D. Wheeler 
Stanley J. Preston 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Carman E. Kipp 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
Attorneys for Defendants 
175 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
ti {% A t <\ & 
% ? / 
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. -#1829 
KIRKG. GIBBS, ESQ. -#5955 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants: 
Paul H. Shaphren 
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building 
Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801)521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PAUL H. SHAPHREN, an individual 
and PARSONS & CROWTHER, a Utah 
professional corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930904040CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court having received Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting Legal Memoranda from the parties on their respective positions concerning the 
motion, having heard argument by both sides, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having now made its ruling in writing, hereby enters Summary Judgment in favor of 
0 0 0 o 
defendants and against plaintiff of no cause of action. 
Dated this •'U ^ fev of March, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
y 
Leslie A. Lewis 
/ Third District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law office of Kipp and Christian, P. C, 
attorneys for defendants, that I served the attached Order Granting Summary Judgment 
herein, upon the parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, on the *-\ day of March, 
1997, to the following: 
Max D. Wheeler, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
JoAnn Tsakalos, Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 5th day of 
I ( 
August, 1997, I caused two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant Syrett Corporation to be served by hand delivery upon the 
following party: 
Carman E. Kipp 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP 8c CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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